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1. INTRODUCTION
The confluence of three global trends is fundamentally
changing the nature of the multinational corporate interaction
with developing country societies: marketization, governmental
decentralization, and the diffusion of decision making in mulina-
tional organizational systems. Constraints imposed by globaliza-
tion hover over all of these adjustments. In some countries,
including Mexico, these constraints are reinforced and accentuated
by the exigencies of regional economic cooperation schemes such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). The
universal rush to open markets, at a time when many fiscal
systems are being retrenched in the interest of macroeconomic
stabilization, risks exacerbation of the- income- gap within
developing countries. It does so between regions and among
households, even as it holds some promise for lessening the gap
between developed and developing countries. Governmental
decentralization and the diffusion of multinational decisionmaking
move the locus of action closer to local levels. Together, these
trends fundamentally change the allocation of global resources, the
role of governments and multinationals in resource distribution,
and the way in which these two institutions interact.
Through marketization, governments of developing countries
are abrogating their control to the marketplace, giving rise to the
possibility that the notorious public sector failures, in all their
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dismaying variety, may be replaced by market failures. For
example, adequate attention to the need for developing the
institutional infrastructure of the market, for regulation, or for
legal structures to undergird market transactions, has not generally
accompanied elimination of economic controls. The widespread
collapse of the Chilean banking system after the first wave of
marketization and the current weaknesses in Mexican, Brazilian,
Venezuelan, or Argentine banking illustrate this.'
With respect to both capital markets and financial intermedi-
ary institutions, the regulatory framework is still far from optimal
(however defined) and the integrity and stability of the financial
institutions are by no means certain. Actual enforcement of
environmental legislation, product safety and consumer protection
regulation are all still on the agenda of new business. Massive
misallocations of resources and confusion in multinational
operating environments are occurring during this transitional
period, as the abrupt drop in Mexican gross domestic product
("GDP") following the peso crisis illustrates.2
A second feature of governmental action in developing
countries has been an effort to spread decisions over a broader
base. Through decentralization, national governments transfer a
substantial component of their remaining power to state and
municipal governments. Local governments are still struggling to
exercise this new power effectively. In many cases, local and state
systems of public administration are even weaker than national
systems. Additionally, public expenditure management and
revenue collection are both problematic in more instances than
not. Although policy changes and constitutional amendments
already reflect the much-discussed trend of decentralization, the
real testing ground is found in implementation, where decentral-
ized authorities have only recently embarked on a learning
process. The debate in developing countries over decentralizing
power through governmental policy, revenue sharing, taxing
authority, and achievement of local administrative efficiency
1 See Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational
Investment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the
Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539,
550-51 (1996) (discussing the default of many Latin American countries on debt
obligations to commercial banks in the early 1980s).
2 See id. at 570 (noting that Mexico's GDP "fell approximately 7%" in
1995).
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parallels that of the United States. However, in developing
countries, one must reckon with an assortment of learning
disabilities on the part of the governments to which new functions
are being transferred.
These changes in governmental policy coincide with the move
of multinational corporations from hierarchical organizations to
a heterarchical diffusion of decisionmaking, so that decisions
formerly reserved for the command core are now made through-
out the multinational organizational network. The dismantling
of multinational command and control systems reflects the
response of these firms to the increased power of the marketplace,
as well as technological advancement. The net result is a shift in
both governmental and multinational decision power to the local
level. According to the principle of subsidiarity, this is where the
power should rest.'
This paper summarizes these three trends as they occur on a
global level, using Mexican agribusiness as a focal example. The
Mexican government, in an attempt to increase agricultural
productivity, is opening its agricultural markets to foreign
corporations, decreasing or eliminating subsidies, privatizing
government-owned agricultural processing plants, and changing
the constitution in order to permit and even promote large-scale
farming. Mexican and foreign firms have responded with
substantial investments. To date, however, the result has been a
drop in rural standards of living, campesinos4 leaving and losing
their land, conflict in the countryside, and losses or below-expecta-
tion profits for many agribusiness ventures.
The Mexican national government is struggling with the
starts and stops of decentralization while Mexican municipal
governments attempt to cope with national policy confusion on
the one hand and, on the other, increasing local exploitation,
marginalization, and unrest.
3 The principle of subsidiarity addresses "vertical challenges to, or
affirmations of, sovereignty" and "accuracy in allocation of authority
vertically." Joel Trachtman, Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty,
Power and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 404-12 (1994) (suggesting that
subsidiarity may indicate "a need for flexibility and experimentation in
allocating functions to varying levels of sub-state units").
' "Campesinos" is the Spanish word that approximates "peasants," "small
farmers," and "rural worker" and embraces all three categories of rural people,
though it is not an exact equivalent to the term "peasant" as given by European
history.
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Both multinational and Mexican agribusinesses are attempting
to cope with the increasing risk in this operating environment, as
exacerbated by the collapse of aggregate demand in 1995, when the
Mexican economy lost more ground than any other country in
the region.' They must do so, however, without the cushion of
home market profits to sustain them and with the added, and
quite substantial, burden of interest rates that shot to exceedingly
high levels in 1994 and 1995 and that remain relatively high
today.' In attempting to weather the current situation, many
multinational businesses are taking a long-term view and have
implemented strategies of collaboration with local groups.
This collision in the Mexican countryside plumbs the issue of
ethical responsibilities for the institutions with the power to
ameliorate or to exacerbate the situation, particularly government,
agribusiness, and nongovernmental organizations. The delibera-
tion and implementation of both public policy and private
strategy need to be analyzed as a bottom-up phenomenon. It
must begin from the grassroots, with a focus on the interaction
among local agribusinesses, local governmental regulators, and the
other local components of civil society. The reason, aside from
a possible ethical imperative, is a pragmatic one. Unless the road
back to prosperity involves a great deal more sharing in the
benefits of growth and much wider access to the evolving
opportunity structure, it is doubtful that the prevailing general
policy framework will endure. This is particularly so because the
country is already conspicuous for having one of the most unequal
income distributions in the world. The experiment that concludes
this report is an attempt to bring about collaboration at the
grassroots in the Mexican states of Guanajuato and Queretaro.
2. MARKETIZATION
2.1. Global Trends
National developmental policies are mid-stride in a basic
paradigm shift. The years of unlimited expansion of governmen-
s See generally ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN, UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC PANORAMA OF LATIN AMERICA
(1996).
6 See Jeff A. Wright, Cetes Fall 2.06 Points, Rates at 1994 Pre-Crisis Level,
The News (Mexico), Sept. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8252483.
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tal budgets and direct involvement in all facets of society are now
gone. Worldwide, governments are changing their development
strategies, moving along the spectrum from economic intervention
toward marketization.
Government-led development is giving way to market-led
development, even where a reliable new institutional framework
is not yet present to lend support. This decrease in the involve-
ment of the state in all sectors of the society is unprecedented.
Governmental expansion and resource allocations are now more
often directed by markets than by governmental ministries and
agencies. Five-year plans have been replaced with forecasts. The
focus is now on efficiency through market pressures. At times,
this approach has conflicted with regulations created to restrain
private monopoly power, to ensure the integrity of financial
intermediaries, and to make available comprehensive and authenti-
cated information needed for the efficient operation of a capital
market.7
Formerly, government-led developmental efforts ranged from
the command economies of Central and Eastern Europe (including
former Soviet republics and China) to the state capitalism of Latin
America. Such efforts have also included the more market-sensit-
ive policies (with heavy governmental involvement) of the
fast-growing economies of East Asia, some of which, of late, have
begun to slow down.' As measured by economic growth, these
governmental efforts were often successful, at least for a while.
The earlier dramatic growth of communist countries, before they
began to stagnate, was followed closely by the well-known Asian
high performers.9 Although Latin America struggled with its
pioneering development strategy of import-substituting industrial-
7 The most notable example was the limited-term monopoly given to
Telefonos de Mexico ("Telmex") on long distance service at the time of
privatization, in addition to its domination of local telephone service. See
Michael Bowen, Telecom Ballot TalliesAnnounced, The News (Mexico), Feb. 11,
1997, available in 1997 WL 8251849 (describing Telmex as a "long time
monopoly holder". While this ran counter to the goal of increasing competi-
tion, it is believed that the government granted the monopoly privileges to
boost its revenue from the privatization sale.
I See generally WORLD BANK, THE EAST AsIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY (1993).
9 See id.; see generally STANISLAW GROMULJKA, GROWTH, INNOVATION,
AND REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE (1986); Gur Ofer, Soviet Economic Growth:
1928-1985, at 25 J. ECON. LITERATuRE 1767-833 (1987).
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ization, Latin American countries experienced substantial growth
in the three decades before 1982.10 This fact inadvertently helped
pave the way for some of the later successes of restructuring, most
notably through diversification into manufacturing exports."
The transfer of the role of central government in development
to other institutions in society (as constrained by regulatory
regimes and market forces) has sparked many changes. It has
altered power relationships and has triggered "learning by doing"
among the various stakeholders of the multinational corporation
(including the consuming public, the labor force, and multiple
levels of government as an over-arching set of stakeholders). It
has also redefined the moral responsibility of the multinational
manager.
2.2. Marketization of Mexican Agriculture
The Salinas government, for all of its alleged shortcomings,
made great headway in following important policy initiatives of
its predecessor, the de la Madrid administration, to open the
economy, install new policies to increase productivity, and recover
Mexico's growth path. One particularly important part of the
new policy package was the move to make Mexican agriculture
more competitive on world markets and to reduce the fiscal drain
of costly agricultural subsidies.1 2  As a procession of earlier
government programs failed to revive an agricultural sector which
had performed relatively well from the 1930s to the early 1960s,
Salinas opened the sector to radical restructuring in 1992 by
abolishing the special legal basis of the ejido system13 that had
been the foundation of constitutionally mandated agrarian
reform. 14 By these means, Salinas hoped to stimulate foreign and
10 See generally LONG-TERM TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (Miguel Urrutia ed., 1991).
11 See generally Montague Lord, Latin America's Exports of Manufactured
Goods, in INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
PROGRESS N LATIN AMERICA, 1992 (1992).
12 See generally REFORMING MEXICO'S AGRARIAN REFORM (Laura Randall
ed., 1996).
13 The ejido structure was a "system of small-property holding controlled
by each village." RODERIC CAMP, POLrTICS IN MEXICO 217 (2d ed. 1996).
14 The government adopted the ejido system after 1915 in its constitutional
reforms of Article 127, distributing land to the legal residents of rural villages
for common use but not legal ownership. See id. at 45, 153.
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domestic investment in agribusiness and realize the country's rich
potential in a variety of labor intensive crops, such as vegetables
and fruits.
Thanks to Mexico's favorable climate, reasonably cheap labor,
and, in scattered regions, areas of fertile soil, there exists the
possibility of regaining the comparative advantages that once
generated a diversified pattern of agricultural exports and simulta-
neously fed the growing population.1 5  Mexican exports have
long enjoyed reasonably good access to the adjacent U.S. market
for most of its crops, with the exception of crops such as sugar
and tomatoes where competing U.S. producers were affected.16
The inauguration of the NAFTA agreement in 1994 seems to
provide a guarantee that Mexico's relatively favorable access to the
world's largest national market will continue, except where, as in
the recent tomato case, political expediency overrides. 17 Mean-
while, the interest expressed by the world's largest integrated
market, the European Union, in negotiating a closer relationship
with Mexico appears to further expand the possibilities for
Mexico's exports, provided the sector can rise to the occasion.18
There is, however, a risk that much of the rural population,
which comprises almost thirty percent of the nation's total
population,19 will lose its access to the subsistence livelihood it
now possesses. Additionally, the reduction of tariffs and subsidies,
along with rising efficiency, may ultimately drive hundreds of
thousands - or even millions - of the rural poor into urban
labor markets that are already oversaturated. In short, phasing
out the ejido system risks replaying the enclosure movement that
" See generally WILLAM 0. FREITHALER, MEXIcO'S FOREIGN TRADE AND
EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT (1968).
16 See generally James Hansen & William Meyers, NAFTA and Domestic
Agricultural Policy: U.S. View, Presentation at Symposium on NAFTA and
Agriculture: Is the Experiment Working? (Nov. 1-2, 1996).
'" See David E. Sanger, President Wins Tomato Accordfor Floridians, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 1996, at A2 (reporting that the Clinton Admininistration
"pressured Mexico into an agreement that will set a minimum price" on
tomatoes it exports to the U.S., thereby satisfying "growers and governmental
officials in one of the most hotly contested states in the presidential election").
"' See EU, Mexico Sign Trade Pact, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1997, at A15
(describing a preliminary trade accord signed by the European Union and
Mexico that "could be the basis for a broader agreement on trade in goods and
services").
'9 See generally INSTTO NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA Y GEOGRAFIA,
CENSO NACIONAL DE POBLACION Y VIVIENDA 1994 (1996).
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began in England in the sixteenth century and reenacting the
widespread hardship that event visited on the rural populace. It
does not take much prescience to foresee that an exacerbation of
the problems of underemployed or unemployed rural workers
would only help fuel an already visible political reaction against
the "neo-liberal policy model."2"
3. GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION
3.1. Global Trends
With marketization, most of the changes in regulation and
restructuring have come at the national level because power
typically rests at that level. Indeed, decreasing controls over the
private sector, including trade liberalization, discontinuation of
financial repression, deregulation of prices and phaseouts of
subsidies, privatization of state-run firms, and a relaxation of
restrictions on both foreign and domestic investment, emanated
from the national level.21 However, most state (or provincial)
and municipal governments have had minimal legislative power,
little or no borrowing capacity, very limited fiscal autonomy, and
a generally underdeveloped capacity to administer regulations.'
With the exception of a few favored cities - perhaps no more
than two dozen or so - the pervasive lack of governmental power
and bureaucratic sophistication at subnational levels has signifi-
cantly inhibited productive multinational/governmental collabora-
tion. In many areas, even personnel recruitment poses problems.
Much of the genuine talent is drawn to the national centers.
There is scattered evidence from different parts of the
developing world that strong control by agencies of the national
government may be changing, albeit modestly in most cases, and
Latin America has been no exception to this trend.2 There, too,
20 See generally NEO-LBERALISM REVISITED: ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING
AND MEXICO'S POLITCAL FUTURE (Gerardo Otero ed., 1996).
21 See generally NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO: THE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY
(1992).
2 See R. ANDREW NIcKsoN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
209 (1995) (observing that municipalities operate as part of the centralized
national party government and are 'highly dependent financially on the federal
government").
23 See generally PROYECTO REGIONAL DE DECENTRALIZACION FISCAL,
DECENTRALIZACION FISCAL EN AMERICA LATINA: BALANCE Y PRINCIPALES
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governments have decentralized their decisionmaking powers,
though few other countries of the region have caught up with
Chile in this respect.24 State officials and municipal mayors are
being elected through more democratic processes, rather than
being appointed by officials occupying higher political or
administrative positions.2 As municipal boundaries typically
extend to the surrounding rural areas, the newly invigorated local
governments effectively give new voice to traditionally under-
represented rural populations whose political representation in
Mexico was co-opted by the corporatist Confederacion Nacional
Campesina.26 However, rural interests have traditionally seldom
dominated or even strongly influenced the municipio unit of
government in Latin America, the equivalent of a combined
city/county government in the United States.V
The development of sophisticated local government units will
be slow. In the interim, local branches of multinational businesses
will face the problems of large power imbalances. However, they
will also enjoy the opportunity to participate in long-term
institutional development of the public sector and to thereby
increase social capability in the hustings far beyond the privileged
political centers. In the long run, multinational enterprises are
more likely to influence development at the local level, which
needs almost any help that is tendered, than at the national level
where company programs tend to get lost in the labyrinthine
structures of government and politics. The prospect of such
influence is all the more promising where the local subsidiary of
a multinational business can interact with increasingly effective
DESAFIO (1996) (reporting alterations).
24 See generally NICKSON, supra note 22; DECENTRALIZATION IN LATIN
AMERICA: AN EVALUATION (Arthur Morris & Stella Lowder eds., 1992)
[hereinafter DECENTRALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA].
25 See NICKSON, supra note 22, at 67 (noting that in the 1980s, "the long-
standing tradition of central government interference through the appointment
of executive heads was increasingly replaced by the democratic election of
municipal authorities").
26 See CAMP, supra note 13, at 112-27 (providing an authoritative discussion
of the corporatist features of Mexican political organization); see generally
VICTORIA E. RODRIGUEZ, DECENTRALIZATION IN MEXICO, FROM REFORMA
MUNICIPAL TO SOLARIDAD TO NUEVO FEDERALISMO (1997) (setting forth the
most current assessment of recent reforms).
27 See NICKsON, supra note 22, at 33-34 (discussing the unwillingness of
Latin American countries to restructure territories to better reflect demographic
changes).
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governmental agencies, local nongovernmental organizations, and
other, nongovernmental or nonpolitical institutions of civil
society.
There is a basic principle at work in the process of governmen-
tal decentralization, namely, the principle of subsidiarity. Many
organizations, such as the regulatory agencies of the European
Union, reflect this principle, which is very similar to the concept
enunciated in the social Christian tradition.28  Essentially, "the
principle of subsidiarity calls for decisions to be made as close as
possible to the issue, to the source of the problem, or to the
opportunity."'29
3.2. The Mexican Experience
As might be expected, Mexico has participated in some of the
foregoing trends and developments. The political system is much
more competitive than it was two decades ago. Two solid
opposition parties, the National Action Party ("PAN") and the
Democratic Revolutionary Party ("PRD"), have emerged to
challenge the hitherto uncontested rule of the Institutional
Revolutionary Party ("PRI"). °
Consequently, opposition candidates have won important
governorships and mayorships. Although the elections that
brought President Salinas to office took place under widespread
allegations of fraud,3' the subsequent national presidential contest
28 The primary sources of this principle, of course, are the papal encyclicals
and letters. See, e.g., POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNo (1931), reprinted
in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS, 1903-1939, at 415 (Claudia Carlen ed. & trans.,
1981); POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA (1961), reprinted in THE
PAPAL ENCYCLICALS, 1958 - 1981, at 58 (Claudia Carlen ed. & trans., 1981)
[hereinafter ENCYCLICALS 1958-1981]; POPE JOHN XXII, PACEM IN TERRIS
(1963), reprinted in ENCYCLICALS 1958-1981, supra, at 107; see also MICHAEL E.
ALLSOPP, THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 927-29
ajudith A. Dwyer ed., 1994) (setting forth a general statement on subsidiarity);
see generally JOSEPH GREMILLION, THE GOSPEL OF PEACE AND JUSTICE (1976)
(providing a well-documented discussion of the many facets of subsidiarity).
29 LEE A. TAVIS, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: MULTINATIONAL MANAG-
ERS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY CONCERNS 354-55 (1997) [hereinafter TAVIS,
POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY].
"o See CAMP, supra note 13, at 183-88 (discussing the historical development
of these opposition parties and the increasing division of votes among the PRI,
PAN, and PRD).
31 See id. at 176 (noting that although many believe that the PI party
engaged in fraudulent practices during the 1988 elections, most "believe that
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and assorted other elections have generally improved on the
standard practices of the past. The elections of 1997, in fact,
resulted in the opposition parties gaining control of the lower
house of Congress, the executive leadership of the huge Federal
District, and the governorships of such important states as Jalisco,
Nuevo Leon, Queretaro, Guanajuato, Chihuahua, and Baja
California.
3 2
Ever mindful of the continuing capacity of the ruling party to
bestow lucrative favors, the electorate has made disproportionate
resources available to the PRI from both the public and private
sectors.33 As a consequence, while the political playing field is
far from level, the recent elections have been a decided advance
beyond the unconcealed manipulation of most elections during the
twentieth century. In fairness, it must be recognized that for
most of its sixty years, the PRI likely commanded the support of
the overwhelming majority of the electorate. Whatever the
niceties that were ignored, Mexico was long spared the dreadful
electoral turbulence, the policy instability, the economic ups and
downs, and the atrocious repression that afflicted so much of
Latin America. Nevertheless, since the 1970s when the course of
policy became more erratic and especially since 1982 when fifty
years of uninterrupted aggregate growth came to an abrupt end,
the PRI's real support base has steadily eroded, though not in a
Salinas actually did win - but that his percentage of the total vote was lower").
32 As of fall 1997, the PAN, the older and more centrist of the two
opposition parties, held six of the thirty-one state governorships: Baja
California, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Nuevo Leon, and Queretaro. See
Enrique Krause, Time Is Running Out for the Mexican PRsaurus, WALL ST. J.,
July 11, 1997, at A15 (summarizing the election outcomes). The PRD, the
leftist/populist opposition party, had captured the leadership of the populous
Federal District. Of the total national population of 91,158,00 in the 1995
census figures, some thirty-one percent (28,593,000) were in political units
governed by the opposition: 8,489,000 by the PRD in the Federal District and
20,104,000 in the states governed by the PAN. Hence, the three most
influential political units in the country which contain the three largest cities
- the Federal District, Jalisco, and Nuevo Leon - were all in the hands of the
opposition after the July elections of 1997.
" See generally MASS MEDIA AND FREE TRADE: NAFTA AND THE
CULTURAL INDUSTRIES (Emile G. McAnany & Kenton T. Wilkinson eds.,
1996) (discussing the disparities in coverage given the different parties).
Although the naked use of public resources to mobilize PRI supporters has
long been widely noted, articipants in the symposium that ave birth to the
cited volume observed how television coverage, in particular, was heavily
slanted to favor the ruling party. See id.
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linear fashion.34
The old regime in which the president selected the governors
and the governors selected the mayors has faded into history.
With its decline has come a decided fraying of the system of
presidential rule, as opposition parties gain a stronger voice in the
national legislature. 5 In the recent tumultuous party congress of
the PRI, the party chieftains delivered one more blow to the
accustomed presidential rule by changing the requirements for the
party's next presidential nominee.36 These changes effectively
diminished the president's freedom to name his successor.
The devolution of political authority from the chief executive
to the party might appear to constitute a desirable move toward
democratization, given the incumbent president's introduction of
a primary system for the selection of party delegates and candi-
dates. However, the ambiguities and nuances of the Mexican
system of politics, wherein a whole nation seems to run in the
subjunctive, by no means assure a more democratic outcome. The
reason is simply that in the last three terms, a political elite has
firmly held the commanding heights, so to speak, of the politi-
cal/administrative structure.
37
These individuals are cosmopolitan and highly educated,
generally born into the privileged upper echelons of political and
administrative bureaucracy, and technocratic in orientation.38
Surprisingly, this elite group, not the rank and file, has provided
the impetus for political and electoral reform.39 In contrast, the
lower levels of the party structure are the preserve of the old-time
34 See generally CAMP, supra note 13 (providing a reliable and thoroughly
researched account of recent changes in the power of the PR).
35 See id. at 158-59.
36 This change, which requires presidential nominees to have held previous
elected office, was introduced at the last p arty congress. However, there are
reasons to believe that it may have been challenged as the party moves toward
the next national elections. Hitherto, the presidentialism that defines the
Mexican political system has meant that each president could, presumably
through a process of consultation that was lacking in transparency, designate
his successor, thereby assuring that the office would be held by either the
technocratic elite or the highest political bureaucracy.
17 See CAMP, supra note 13, at 118-19 (noting that the credentials of
President Zedillo mirror those of his cabinet members, who were selected from
a generation of politicians known as tecnicos, or "technocrats").
" See id. (noting that most tecnicos come from middle-class or upper-class
families in large cities and have studied abroad).
31 See id. at 120.
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party bosses, their machines, and their multitudinous hangers-
on.' Popularly known as the "dinosaurs," these lower level
members sit like crows perched on branches waiting out the
agitation of reform in order to sweep back into the fields for easy
pickings.41
The Mexican system of governance has experienced decentral-
ization as well. State governments have increasingly gained
authority over segments of the educational system.42 Additional-
ly, in some cases, administrative capacity at state and local levels
has notably improved. The Salinas administration established the
National Solidarity Program ("PRONASOL"),43 perhaps the most
conspicuous measure of decentralization, to distribute federal
funds more widely among public works projects created and
implemented at the community level. 44 Still, PRONASOL was
essentially a decentralized federal program rather than one
instituted by either state or local governments.45
Despite increased revenue sharing, particularly in states, the
basic centralized structure of public finance remains essentially
undisturbed. The federal government still collects the vast
majority of the taxes, which provide the fiscal resources for public
investment programs. Indeed, the durable propensity in the
revenue/expenditure pattern, the role of patronage, and the
informal market in political and administrative favors combine to
sustain the PRI's power even in circles that are marginally more
contestable. Thus, the political system has yet to realize the
factors of responsiveness and accountability.
The North American Development Bank's initiative to lend
money for environmental projects in Mexican border communities
reflects the limits on local autonomy and the time-consuming
40 See id.
41 See id. at 121, 123 (noting that technocratic leaders have faced great
criticism for their lack of political experience and suggesting that they will "face
severe challenges").
42 See Victoria E. Rodriguez, Mexico's Decentralization in the 1980's:
Promises, Promises, Promises..., in DECENTRALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA,
supra note 24, at 132 (discussing the program to decentralize education).
4' The popular name "PRONASOL" means "solidarity." See CAMP, supra
note 13, at 217.
' See id. (noting that the program provided loans to farmers and allowed
communities to establish medical clinics, renovate schools, and award
scholarships).
45 See id.
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difficulties of navigating the upper tiers of the bureaucracy. By
early 1997, although massive funds were committed to this
initiative, the Bank had only made four loans.46
By and large, the government/party structures have used
agricultural programs, and the control of "peasant" organizations
more as a means to harvest votes rather than to respond effective-
ly to rural needs.47 Under these circumstances, it is hardly
surprising that public investment programs have seldom, at least
in recent decades, effectively addressed rural sector needs. And if
public service delivery systems tend to be anemic at most
municipal levels (where social capacity is limited), they are
positively anorexic in the countryside. Thus, in a system that
historically has been highly centralized, one cannot assume that
the current program of decentralization from federal to state levels
will find the requisite administrative capability at subnational
levels of the public sector. This administrative shortfall may exist
despite the improvement of goals and design of programs in
furtherance of the formalities of devolution and deconcentration.
Even these advances must be examined with a healthy dose of
skepticism. There is no a priori reason for confidence that
administrative devolution will lead to an increased voice in policy
formation at either the national or subnational levels, particularly
where rural populations are concerned. Thus, the substitution of
the social organization of the campesinado and of non-govern-
mental organizations for weak market constraints and for equally
weak mechanisms for ensuring citizen sovereignty or for remedy-
ing market and public-sector failures, becomes a critical variable.
4. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE DECISION DIFFUSION
The fundamental decisionmaking issue for multinational
corporations involves balancing interests in network uniformity
and local flexibility.4 The global-local balance must be deter-
mined for every facet of operations. Organizationally, the trade-
46 Memorandum from Alfredo Phillips, Former President of the North
American Development Bank (Summer 1997) (on file with author).
47 See, e.g., CLARISSA HARDY RASKOvAN, EL ESTADO Y Los CAMPESINOS:
LA CONFEDERAcION NACIONAL CAMPESINA (CNC) (Centro de Estudios
Economicos y Sociales del Tercer Mundo ed., 1984).
48 See TAVIS, POWER AND RESPONSIBIuTY, supra note 29, at 384-88
(discussing in depth the concept of multinational organizations as a network).
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off is shifting in an international environment of dramatic change.
The role of the multinational corporate core in decisionmaking
and control has substantially declined. Staff that once conducted
intense monitoring and control has now been substantially
reduced. 9  However, coordination across the network and
among the elements is still critical to taking advantage of network
synergies. With the drift of decisionmaking away from the core,
multiple informational ties among the elements replace the
narrow, bilateral relationships of the past. 0 Lateral network
relationships necessarily become more dense as hierarchical
relationships diminish. Multinational enterprises are thus
changing to multilateral organizations where the focus of decisions
is moving from the core to the stakeholder interfaces."
Given the overall tendency toward diffusion, there is little
uniformity within individual enterprise networks. Each subsidiary
assumes a unique, specific role, according to the regions and
communities they serve. Organizational standardization is a thing
of the past. Various organizational network elements thus serve
different functions in the enterprise network, particularly as they
relate to strategic planning.52 Organizations lacking a uniform
structure that fits the unique functions of the various constituent
units have been described as "differentiated networks."53
Multinationals are also spreading outward in network form
from the multinational enterprise core and subsidiaries to joint
ventures, strategic business alliances, and firms linked chiefly by
agreements- 4 In this diffusion process, the new multiple decision
41 See id. at 354.
5' See Julian M. Birkinshaw & Allen J. Morrison, Configurations a/Strategy
and Structure in Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations, 26 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 729-53 (1995) (distinguishing between hierarchical and heterarchical
models of multinational enterprise structure).
s' See TAvIS, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 29, at 353.
See Anil K. Gupta & Vijay Govindarajan, Knowledge Flows and the
Structure of Control Within Multinational Corporations, 16 AcAD. MGMT. REV.
768-92 (1991) (categorizing subsidiaries relative to knowledge flows into
categories of "global innovator," "integrated player," "implementor," and "local
innovator").
13 See CHRISTOPHER A. BARTLETT & SUMANTRA GHOSHAL, MANAGING
ACROSS BORDERS: THE TRANSNATIONAL SOLUTION 62 (1991) (noting that "in
such cases, headquarters relinquishes its lead role to the subsidiary - a key
attribute of the transnational that contrasts sharply with the uniformity of
organizational roles in more traditional companies").
"' See TAVIS, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 29, at 354-56.
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centers must remain an integral part of the enterprise organiza-
tional network. This is imperative if they are to tap into the
contributions from other elements while themselves contributing
to other elements and network synergies. In some respects, firms
in the emerging business system resemble schools of fish swim-
mng in concert.
The trend toward multinational decision diffusion combined
with the devolution of duties in host governments changes the
way decisions are reached in a multinational enterprise as well as
their location. Local multinational managers with more discretion
and authority are negotiating with local governmental units,
which are often inexperienced and unsure of their authority
within the larger governmental structure. The advantage of
information, experience, and hence power, is clearly on the side
of the multinationals. This shift in power is exacerbated by the
governmental abrogation of power associated with marketization.
5. AGRIBUSINESS DECISIONMAKING IN MEXICO
Mexican agricultural marketization has been associated with a
substantial amount of both domestic and foreign investment that
has led to mixed results. Notorious failures in terms of communi-
ty disruption and business losses have accompanied the transition
from small communal and independent farms to large agricultural
operations. Nonetheless, other projects have survived and hold
promise for the long run. The factors of marketization, decentral-
ization, and decision diffusion influence all of these experiences.
Pilgrim's Pride, a foreign entrant into Mexican agriculture, is
a prime example of the program described in this Article.55
Pilgrim's Pride, an American poultry producer, was attracted to
Mexico because of its geographical proximity to the United States
and the size of the Mexican market. The company's Mexican
experience reflects both the movement toward marketization and
decentralization by the Mexican government, and keen managerial
awareness of the need for collaboration with local components of
the civil society.
In the early 1970s, the management of Pilgrim's Pride began
55 All of the references in Section 5 to the Pilgrim's Pride model are taken
from the same source. See Ronald W. Nicholas, Agribusiness and Ejido
Producers: A Grains and Poultry Case, Address at the Conference on Agribusi-
ness in the Mexican Countryside (April 21, 1989).
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to look to Mexico for its initial venture into foreign markets.
The Mexican market was large and growing rapidly, propelled for
most of the decade by the oil boom. At that time, agriculture in
Mexico was a protected industry and, as such, reflected the lagging
productivity typically associated with protected markets. Pilgrim
Pride's planning, begun in earnest in the late 1970s, involved
extensive discussion with Mexican officials, a search for Mexican
companies to acquire, and an analysis of financing alternatives.
The investigation and arrangements continued for ten years,
largely because of extended negotiations with the Mexican
government. In January 1988, Pilgrim's Pride opened the first
foreign-owned poultry operation in Mexico. Two Americans and
1,500 Mexicans staffed the new facility.
The history of Pilgrim's Pride de Mexico reflects the Mexican
transition from government-led to market-led development. In
the 1970s and early 1980s, the Mexican government was deter-
mined to control development in all sectors of the economy. The
experienced Mexican technocrats, convinced they could manage
development more efficiently than the marketplace, were still in
place during the 1980s, even as Mexico began to gradually open
her borders. 6
Under government-led development, all foreign entrants were
subject to the Law on Foreign Investments. 7 This law reserved
certain industries for governmental management, prohibited
foreign capital in so-called "strategic industries," and limited
foreign capital to a maximum of forty-nine percent ownership or
control in the other areas of the economy.5" Following the
requirement for a majority Mexican controlling interest, however,
the law went on to state: "[t]he National Commission on Foreign
56 See Kenneth P. Jameson & Juan M. Rivera, The Mexican Case: Communi-
cation Under State Capitalism, in MULTINATIONAL MANAGERS AND HOST
GOVERNMENT INTERACTIONS 221 (Lee A. Tavis ed., 1988) (analyzing Mexican
regulation during that period).
17 Several studies detail the Mexican stance toward foreign investment and
of Mexican industrial policy at that time. See, e.g., Gary Gereffi, The
Renegotiation of Dependency and the Limits of State Autonomy in Mexico (1975-
1982), in MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE POLTICAL ECONOMY OF
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Theodore Moran ed., 1985); Merilee Grindle,
Public Policy, Foreign Investment, and Implementation Style in Mexico, in
ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLITICAL CONFLICT: U.S. LATIN AMERICAN
RELATIONS Gorge Dominguez ed., 1982).
5 See Jameson & Rivera, supra note 56, at 220.
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Investment may decide on the increase or reduction of the
percentage when it judges this to be in the interest of the
country's economy, and it may establish the conditions under
which foreign investment will be accepted in specific cases."59
This clause effectively gave complete discretion to the regulator in
choosing whether to follow the ownership guideline.0" Evaluat-
ing the impact of this provision, Jameson and Rivera note that:
[i]t is this paragraph which defines the interaction
between the MNCs and the Mexican government.
The reality is that 'anything is negotiable.' The law
is simply a starting point. Any final outcome will be
a result of a negotiating process between the National
Investment Commission, as a representative of
Mexico, and the MNC.61
Throughout negotiations with Mexico that would last a
decade, Pilgrim's Pride fought to maintain sole ownership of its
venture. In doing this, it followed the footsteps of IBM, likewise
insistent on maintaining 100% control of its Mexican affiliates and
making a number of concessions to Mexican authorities to do
so. 62 In exchange for government approval to enter Mexico with
full ownership, Pilgrim's Pride made commitments relating to
investment growth, employment, and education. Management
agreed to double production and employment within the first five
years of operation, to share the technology being introduced into
Mexico, and to stress the education of employees. 63
Pilgrim's Pride has met these negotiated targets. Production
increased from 450,000 birds processed per week to over two
million per week. Employment at the plant has grown from
1,500 to 3,000. All profits generated by the Mexican operation
were reinvested to a total investment of over $150 million.
Transferred technology, including the use of cardboard boxes,
5 Id. at 221.
60 See id. at 209 (noting that "so much flexibility is written into the law
that the authorities' case-by-case application is the key to the actual communica-
tion").
61 Id. at 221.
62 See id. at 222 (discussing the process of expansion of IBM investment into
Mexico).
63 IBM made similar commitments. See id.
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then plastic tubs, and finally refrigerated trucks rather than beds
of ice to ship chickens, has improved both sanitation and
handling. Education, a top priority, includes on-the-job training
focused on learning production procedures with a continuing
strong emphasis on total quality management. Other educational
efforts allow access to formal education through "open education
programs" where Pilgrim's Pride sponsors employee primary and
secondary education.
Pilgrim's Pride de Mexico is now a fully integrated poultry
operation that includes hatcheries, farms, feed mills, and process-
ing plants. In addition to its own facilities, Pilgrim's Pride
contracts about forty percent of its chicken production to
outsiders. These subcontracting poultry producers are provided
with birds, feed, and chicken-growing technology. Payment is
based upon the conversion of feed to meat, the survival rate of the
birds, and the capability of the poultry producers to meet other
Pilgrim's Pride requirements. Pilgrim's Pride's management has
worked with these subcontracting poultry producers to improve
and update their facilities, has helped them obtain loans and
equipment, and has provided guidance in the installation of that
equipment. Three of these subcontracting producers are ejidos -
small farmers forced into community landholdings by the 1917
Mexican constitution.
At the time of Pilgrim's Pride's entry in 1988, the Mexican
poultry industry had been in decline. Despite substantial
overcapacity, there was insufficient market pressure to force the
introduction of new technology or to enhance productivity.
Many of the 400 existing companies had not maintained their
facilities. Employees had not been kept current on advances in
production procedures. These factors, combined with market
price swings of up to thirty-five percent, led to an unstable
poultry industry. At that time, the Mexican countryside was
littered with small, failed poultry operations.
Since 1988, the industry has seen substantial change. Of the
400 initial producers, about fifty have turned to the production of
other products, primarily vegetables, and another fifty have
merged with larger producers. While on schedule with learning
curves and cost reductions, Pilgrim's Pride has nevertheless found
that the market has not supported its revenue targets. Prices
continue to fluctuate within the thirty to thirty-five percent range.
Moreover, the Mexican poultry industry has yet to experience
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the full challenge and opportunity associated with NAFTA. To
prepare for the completely open borders among NAFTA
members, poultry received an allowance of ten years and a
nonline reduction of tariffs on imports over the authorized quota
under the treaty. For example, in NAFTA Year Three, the
Mexican tariff on imported poultry was still over 200%. Pilgrim's
Pride de Mexico has only six more years to sharpen its Mexican
productivity to compete with U.S. production."
Closely associated with Pilgrim's Pride's governmental
negotiations were its discussions with Mexican producers.
Entering Mexico was very different from stepping into an openly
competitive market. In the protected Mexican markets, with
strong but flexible governmental controls, the foreign entrant had
to convince local industry of its potential contribution to existing
producers. This was a challenging task.
The four Mexican companies initially acquired by Pilgrim's
Pride were purchased through a debt/equity swap with the
Mexican government. In this process, Mexican sovereign debt was
purchased in the international debt markets at a deep discount.
The Mexican government, for a fee, traded this debt for the right
to acquire equity in the Mexican firms. The net result was a price
discount on the cost of these companies. Of the four firms
acquired by Pilgrim's Pride, three were operating at below-instal-
led-capacity levels and one had ceased production altogether.
Negotiations for these acquisitions reflected the same need for
legal and cultural flexibility as that required for governmental
approval. Signed legal agreements were not binding and cycled
over and over. Again, the necessity of local flexibility and
decision diffusion for the local business unit was recognized.
The starts and stops of Mexican governmental decentralization
outlined above have paralleled the transition from government-led
to market-led development. This has exacerbated the transfer of
power in foreign direct investments from pre-investment to post-
investment. In the pre-investment stage, the foreign direct
investor has the option and power to withhold investment.
However, once the investor commits assets, particularly in a
controlled economy, a major part of this power shifts to regulato-
61 U.S. production will likely flow into at least a part of Mexico due to
anticipated lower overall pricing of U.S. poultry items when all tariffs and
quotas are removed.
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ry agencies. The locus of interaction between the government and
the multinational also changes. While pre-entry operating
negotiations take place at the national level, post-entry operating
negotiations involve more local issues.65
With marketization, much of the role of national governmen-
tal agencies is transferred to the marketplace. At the state and
local levels, different forms of regulation are less affected by
marketization. In contrast, decentralization permits a good part
of the remaining national governmental power to shift gradually
to state and local officials. Therefore, the net result of both the
natural process of commitment of assets by foreign direct
investors and of governmental decentralization is the assignment
of greater importance to on-site regulators.
As noted, the Mexican project was the first foreign venture for
Pilgrim's Pride. Throughout its talks with the Mexican govern-
ment and local companies, the Pilgrim's Pride negotiating team
needed the same kind of flexibility that Mexican officials and
managers of Mexican firms possessed. This was the first step in
the diffusion of decisionmaking for Pilgrim's Pride. Indeed,
latitude in negotiation was critical in coping with the exceptional
volatility of the Mexican economy and the groundbreaking
national policies of that decade.
Since its entry, Pilgrim's Pride's interaction with local
employees and their communities has reflected the company's
continuing decisionmaking diffusion. As noted above, any foreign
direct investor faces a delicate balance between the uniform
maintenance of standards by the company and the need to
staunchly respect certain dimensions of the local culture.66 For
Pilgrim's Pride, its simultaneous attempts to create change in the
workplace and to fit into the community reflect this balance. In
the workplace, Pilgrim's Pride imposes production procedures and
modifies employee work habits through training. Emphasis is on
output rather than on hours spent, and the organization continual-
ly stresses principles of total quality management.
65 The regulation of corporate operations, such as industrial zoning
requirements, water use permits, or environmental controls, are local issues.
66 This parallels the uniformity versus relativism debate in the literature of
ethics. See TAVIS, POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 29, at 384-88
(noting that multinationals must determine "where the uniformity of corporate
culture will overrule the spontaneity of response within the diversity of local
cultures").
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Within the community, Pilgrim's Pride attempts to minimize
the disruption associated with the arrival of foreign agribusiness.
Its policy is to reach out to community organizations and attempt
to acculturate. In an effort to understand local conditions,
Pilgrim's Pride has commissioned a number of community
surveys, a project undertaken by the University of Queretaro. As
the University researchers noted, "the company learned a lot and
did not always like what it heard."67 As part of its community
harmonization program, Pilgrim's Pride has built community
centers, donated products, money, and time, and sponsored local
scholarships, internship programs, and athletic teams. The
company is conscious of maintaining or exceeding pay standards,
and it provides employee access to hospitalization, life insurance,
and savings plans. And, to convince the local communities of
Pilgrim's commitment, Pilgrim's Pride de Mexico has a policy of
retaining all cash generated in its Mexican operations.
In sum, the experience of Pilgrim's Pride de Mexico reflects
the Mexican government's efforts toward marketization and
decentralization, as well as the trend toward corporate decision
diffusion. Upon Pilgrim's Pride's entry, the Mexican government
granted a waiver of the 100% ownership restriction, hoping that
the company's presence would stimulate productivity in the
Mexican poultry industry. Also, the fledgling efforts of the
Mexican government to decentralize its regulation and bureaucra-
cy continue to exacerbate the shift from national to local
governmental regulation of foreign corporate entry. As a
consequence, parties must now chart new territory in defining
their working relationships. Thus, in the case of Pilgrim's Pride,
a compelling need for local flexibility in the fluid governmental,
agribusiness, and economic conditions of Mexican agriculture has
forced decision diffusion.
6. CONCLUSION
Marketization is creating dramatic change in the Mexican
countryside. While there is promise for enhancing agricultural
productivity, segments of Mexican society are being left behind in
the process. As with all modernization, the people who do not
67 Mark Martinez & Gaspar Real, Agribusiness and Ejido Producers: A
Grains and Poultry Case, Address at the Conference on Agribusiness in the
Mexican Countryside (April 21, 1989).
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have access to the means for self-advancement are increasingly
marginalized. Unfortunately, in the case of Mexican agriculture,
higher productivity has yet to be achieved on a broad basis.
While a few agribusinesses are prospering, large numbers of
individuals, families, and communities are experiencing massive
dislocation. Still, the devolution of government and corporate
decisions to the local level provides opportunities for innovative
collaboration among these groups and other local components of
the civil society. This can lead to real insight and focused efforts
that national programs or distant business decision makers cannot
attain. Thus, local catalysts need to, and will, emerge.
One attempt to tap this local potential is the seminar program,
"Agribusiness in the Mexican Countryside," being undertaken
jointly by the Universidad Autonoma de Queretaro, the Universi-
ty of Notre Dame, and Michigan State University.68 This
seminar is taking place in the adjacent Mexican states of Queretaro
and Guanajuato, which have long figured prominently in Mexican
history. These states are in the midst of political, administrative,
and economic transformations that appear to be harbingers of the
changes that will affect the entire nation over the coming years.
Attempts at government decentralization are clearly evident in the
two states. Each state currently has governorships held by the
political opposition.69 Hence, what happens in Queretaro and
Guanajuato will be part of the showcase the Partido de Accion
Nacional presents to the national electorate three years down the
road.
More importantly, the project explores how business and
nongovernmental organizations can work with state and local
governments to enhance employment opportunities for the
peasantry within an evolving framework of national policies
68 The first meeting of the seminar sponsored by the Notre Dame Program
on Multinational Managers and Developing Country Concerns and the
Michigan State University Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies
was held at the University of Notre Dame on April 21-23, 1996. The urgency
of the situation moved Notre Dame and Michigan State to join with the
Universidad Autonoma de Queretaro to hold a second meeting in Queretaro,
Mexico on October 19-21, 1997 to assess experience and evaluate possible
approaches. Those attending the Queretaro conference observed that an op en
and frank discussion among such a diverse set of participants had not, to their
collective knowledge, ever taken place in Mexico. The study group is now
moving to a research phase in preparation for a third meeting in Mexico.
69 See supra note 32.
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designed to improve productivity and incomes. The seminar
process involves intensive interaction among Mexican and U.S.
agribusiness executives, Mexican national and state governmental
officials from Queretaro and Guanajuato, local campesino groups,
ejidatarios (small ejido farmers), academics, and international and
Mexican non-governmental organizations active in the local area.
With appropriate social organizational strategies, there is at
least a chance that this cradle of Mexican independence in the
early nineteenth century can again lead the way into the twenty-
first century, finally realizing the vision that once spurred on the
efforts of Moralos and Hidalgo, the fathers of modern Mexico.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol18/iss4/5
